Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply by William T. Dickens & Shelly J. Lundberg
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOURS RESTRICTIONS AND LABOR SUPPLY
William T. Dickens
Shelly J. Lundberg
Working Paper No. 1638




e would like to thank Ronald McGuire and Alan McArthur for expert
research assistance and the Institute of Industrial Relations at
Berkeley for generous research support. The research reported here
is part of the NBER'S research program in Labor Studies. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1638
June 1985
Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply
ABSTRACT
This study presents a model of labor supply in which individuals may
face constraints on their choice of work hours, and analyzes the
sensitivity of parameter estimates and policy conclusions to the usual
assumption of unrestricted choice. We set up the labor supply decision as
a discrete choice problem, where each worker faces a finite number of
employment opportunities, each offering fixed hours of work.The
distribution from which these are drawn, as well as the number of draws, is
estimated along with the behavioral parameters of individual labor supply.
The standard model with unconstrained hours appears as a special case where
the number of draws approaches infinity. We estimate the mean absolute
difference between desired and actual work hours to be about ten hours per
week. The results strongly support the notion that hours choices are
constrained, and suggest that models which ignore restrictions on hours
worked may yield biased estimates of the wage elasticity of desired hours.
Further, we suggest that analysis of policies such as income transfers and
the flat rate tax which do not consider their effects on the distribution














Most jobs appear to be associated with a fixed number of hours which
must be worked each week, as well as a fixed wage or salary. Thestandard
9 to 5 day, five days a week, is the most obvious example, but other
regular shifts or office hours leave most workers with very little
discretion regarding hours supplied in the short run. At first glance,
this common observation is inconsistent with the textbook model of the
labor supply decision, in which each individual freely chooses the number
of hours he will work, taking as given a fixed wage per hour. However, if
avariety of hours packages are costlessly available, workers may simply
choose those which 'impose' the desired number of hours.Enough mobility
between jobs will thus preserve the simple model even if hours within each
job are completely inflexible. Observed hours will always be equal to
desired hours.If workers are perfectlymobile between jobs, or have
incomplete information regarding job opportunities, they may not choose
their hours from the entire market distribution of jobs. In this case,
models which assume that hours worked are determined by preferences only
will be misspecified, and mayproduce biased estiriates of labor supply
elasticities. Further, policy analysis which considers the individual's
response to tax and transfer changes, but does not take account of their
effect on the constraints individuals face, may be very misleading.
In recent years, labor supply studies have appeared which depart from
the standard framework to allow for various types of constraints on hours
1choices. A major impetus to this development has been the observation that
cross—sectional variation in hours worked is explained very poorly by
standard labor supply models. Inconveniently, even the simplest of hours
regressions is seldom reported with a measure of goodness—of—fit, but
studies reported in Cain and Watts (1973), such as those by Hall and by
Boskin, typically report a standard error of about 1000 hours per year for
a cross—section of white husbands.
A glance at the actual distribution of hours worked by a sample of
prime—age married men suggests that its peculiar shape makes an important
contribution to this poor fit.It also suggests that some form of
constraint on hours choices might be a plausible addition to the model.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of average weekly hours during 1972 for a
group of 18 to 59 year old married men from the Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment (DIME) sample. This is a low—income sample, but the hours
distribution is typical of that which would be observed for a more
representative sample. The most obvious characteristics of this
distribution are the extreme peak at 40 hours per week and the asymmetry
around this peak. These features are even more pronounced in a
distribution of hours worked in one month.
A distribution of desired hours with this shape would be difficult to
produce using a standard model of labor supply and customary assumptions
about the distribution of unobservable worker characteristics. Given the
preponderance of jobs between 36 and 40 hours, men who work an average of
26—35 hours per week are unusually scarce.In general, predicted
distributions based on wages, non—labor income and demographic variables
are smooth and unimodal, and fit the actual distribution very poorly.
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Figure1Superimposed on the actual distribution inFigure 1 is adistributionof
desired hours, derived from a simple linear labor supply regression.1
How can we explain the paucity of observations at 30 hours per week?
It seems likely to us that constraints have been misspecified in the
standard model, and that jobs offering an average of 30 hours per week are
difficult or costly to come by. This conjecture we intend to explore by
specifying constraints of a general form and building them into the model.
In doing so, we of necessity neglect other possible explanations. One is
misreporting; many people may have worked 30 hours but reported 40 due to
conventional attitudes about what constitutes a 'full—time' job. This is
unlikely to provide more than a partial explanation, since the phenomenon
appears invariant to the type of survey instrument used. It is also not
clear that misreporting should be asymmetric around 40 hours. A second
possibility is that, despite the poor fit of conventional models, very few
people wanted to work 30 hours. This suggests that models with more
flexible functional forms and/or more elaborate distributions for
unobserved components of tastes should be estimated.
One simple way of explaining why workers are seldom observed to work
30 hours per week is to assert that jobs offering 30 hours are difficult to
find. That is, workers face a limited choice of hours from a market
distribution (so that desired hours need not equal actual hours) and some
hours choices, seldomoffered by firms, are scarce. Implicit in this is
the notion that jobs are associated with fixed hours. If there are
significant fixed costs in set—up, hiring and training, firms may not be
indifferent regarding the hours worked by employees. Thus, firms may offer
tied sales of wages and hours and workers will choose their preferred
4package from among those offered. The result will be a market distribution
of wage—hours packages which need not be uniform over hours.2 The actual
distribution of offered hours will thus take into account workers'
preferences, but may still act as a constraint on the individual job
searcher.
We construct a model of labor supply with hours restrictions of a very
simple, but very general form, at the cost of assuming that wages are
constant over hours. At any point in time, each individual can choose from
among a finite set of jobs offering fixed hours. These jobs have been
drawn at random from a market distribution which is the same for everyone
in the sample. Observed hours will correspond to the job which yields
highest utility, where the alternative of not working at all is always
available. A discrete choice between a limited number of jobs seems a
reasonable but parsimonious representation of actual constraints on hours
worked. The polar cases of no constraints on hours worked and completely
exogenous hours are easily nested within the general case as infinite
available jobs or only one available job, respectively.
Estimating this model should generate two results of interest. The
first is a measure of the sensitivity of labor supply parameter estimates
and behavioral predictions to the assumption that there are no constraints
on the hours choices of individual workers. The second is an estimate of
the degree of constraint experienced by individuals in their hours worked,
in terms of the expected discrepancybetweendesired hours and the 'best'
value of offered hours.
Previous studies have examined the effects of direct hours constraints
on labor supply decisions, but the specification of these constraints has
5in general been very restrictive. For example, there exists a large
literature focusing on 'take—it—or—leave—it' choices between the standard
work week or not working at all. Citations can be found in lleckman,
Killingsworth, and MaCurdy (1981) and a surveyinPenman (1969). Closely
related are studies by Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) which allow potential
retireesa choice between full—time work at a high wage, part—time work at
a lower wage, or full retirement. The possible presence of quantity
constraints on hours worked has received a great deal of attention in
recent years, but tests for such constraints have contrasted the extreme
cases of exogenous hours and free choice of hours, without considering the
possibility of a discrete choice between several jobs with different hours.
For example, see Ashenfelter (1980), Deaton and Muellbauer (1981), 11am
(1982), Blundell and Walker (1982), and Lundberg (1985). Most closely
related to the approach we have taken in this paper are models in which
each individual faces a stochastic lower bound on hours worked.4 Moffitt
(1982) estimates such a model using income maintenance experiment data. At
the means of the independent variables, the estimated value of minimum
hours was 39 hours per week, implying that the 'vast majority' of the
sample was constrained in its hours choice. This result is perhaps not
surprising given the observed distribution of hours, but it suggests to us
that a discrete choice approach to hours constraints may give a more
complete picture of the process generating that distribution.5
The next section presents in detail the model tobe estimated, and
Section Ill derives the likelihood function. Section IV describes the data
and presents the results for the conventional and the constrained labor
supply models. Section V contains some conclusions and outlines possible
extensions.
6II. The Model
There are many possible ways of representing a restricted choice of
hours in a labor supply model, from a pure rationing approach to an
explicitly dynamic search model in which information about and mobility
between jobs is costly. The approach we take is, in the interests of
computational feasibility, a compromise between the ad hoc assumption of
exogenous hours, and a highly structured choice model. e represent the
worker's choice as a static one between a limited number of job offers. By
suppressing the time dimension, we do not wish to suggest that workers are
immobile during the month or year we take as a time frame, but that
observed choices may usefully be treated 'as if' they were the outcome of a
static decision as represented in Figure 2.
Income
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Figure 2
7This worker has drawn three job offers with fixed hours h1, 112. h3 from the
market distribution and is always able to work zero hours and receive only
non—labor income at point D. None of these correspond to desired hours,
h. Observed hours will be determined by that one of the feasible points
(A, B, C, and D) which yields the highest level of utility (in this case
B —> h2).
Estimating a labor supply model with constraints on hours places very
heavy demands on the available data, which consist of observed wage—hours
combinations and a vector of personal characteristics for a cross—section
of workers. Since the worker chooses the utility—maximizing draw from a
discrete set of alternatives, we need to specify preferences completely,
rather than just a labor supply function. In addition to the parameters of
the utility function, the number of job offers drawn and the shape of the
market offer distribution must be estimated. Identification of these three
sets of parameters requires that some restrictions be imposed on the model.
A.The Market Distribution of Offered Hours
On the demand side, we begin with the assumption that employers offer
jobs with fixed hours of work. Rather than explicitly modelling the
availability of jobs with different hours, we will attempt to estimate the
distribution in an essentially unrestricted form. The standard assumption
that wages are equal at all hours of work is maintained.
Workers face a limited choice from a market distribution of employment
opportunities: N job offers, each associated with a fixed number of hours,
drawn randomly from a discrete distribution.6 The probability that any job
8drawnfrom the distributionrequires hhours of work perweek is the same




where the ii's are a vector of constants describing the frequency of offers
for each integer value of hours worked per week and II is maximum hours. In
practice, the EL's will be set equal over some ranges of hours, to reduce
the number of parameters which must be estimated. This step function for
the hours distribution was chosen rather than a more standard parametric
form, since we do not wish to place any a priori restrictions on the shape
of the offer distribution. The option of voluntarily working zero hours. is
available to all workers, even if this is not one of the offers drawn.
B.Number of Job Offers
Two different specifications for the number of job offers, N, will be
considered. The first specification treats N as random, drawn by each
individual from a binomial distribution with a fixed maximum, and estimates
the single parameter of this distribution. For example, if we set the
maximum possible job offers at 10, the probability that an individual will
receive N offers will be
p(N+1) ={J N(1_)9_Nfor N0,...,9
\N/
The estimated value of p will thus irrply probabilities for integer values
of N, with a mean of 9p+l offers.
9To test the distributional assumption that N is binomial, wc also
estimate a second specification in which the probabilities for different
numbers of job offers vithin a range are allowed to vary freely, with no
distributional form imposed.
C.Preferences
Workers wish to supply labor so as to maximize utility, which is a
function of the number of hours worked and consumption. Worker i can
expect to receive from any employer a wage w, so his utility in a job








where is person i's nonlabor income and consumption is equal to the sum
of labor and nonlabor income. The parameters 0 < < 1 and 2 > 1 are
common to all workers, as is A > 0.To allow for variation in individual
preferences, the parameters B ae replaced by
The vector X contains observed individual characteristics, such as age and
number of children, which might be expected to capture differences in
preferences and Ejrepresentsunobserved characteristics."
10III. Estimation
The model described above was estimated using maximum likelihood
methods.If the unobserved components of tastes, were known, a
complete preference ordering of all possible job offers could be
constructed. In this case, the likelihood of observing person i choosing
to work h1 hours is the probability that at least one job offering h was
drawn from the market distribution, and that no other offers were preferred
to h1. For clarity of exposition, we first derive the likelihood terni for
an individual conditional on the value of a1, then treat the case where we
know only the population density of a.
For each individual i we can define a set of hours which yield a
level of utility less than or equal to the utility derived from observed
hours h1.
=[j:U1(c1(j),j) < U1(c(h1)1h1) ,j=O,l,...,E).
Recalling that P(h1) is the probability that a single draw will
generate an offer of h1 hours, the probability that one draw will yield an
offer which is not preferred to oserved hours will be
P(k)
hal1
Q1 is a function of individual preferences and the unobservable c through
the set J. The likelihood of observing h1 hours when the number of offers
drawn is N is simply the probability that all N offers were equal to or not
preferred to h1, and that at least one offer was h1, or
(3) [Q)N *[1—(1—P(h)IQ1)N].
11There is one special case, since the option of not working is always
available. If we define an index function
V(h) =(0if h =0
1 otherwise
then the full likelihood can be written
V(h.)
(4) L(h1: X11Y1,w1c1) =[Q]N*[1—(1—P(h)/Q)N1
1
Inpractice c is unobservable. The set of preferred hours for each
individual will be a function of the unobservable component of preferences,
so in general constructing the likelihood function will involve integrating
over the distribution of .Weassume that the aj's are i.i.d. normal
random variables and rewrite the likelihood as
V( h.)
(5) L(h:X11Y1w1) =Jo()[Q(8)]N *[1_(1_P(h1)/Q1(e)N}
1
where0(c)isthe normal density with variance c.
Considering only integer values of hours1 the set of hours not
preferred to h1 becomes a step function in c. Step changes occur at
values of c where person i is indifferent between working h1 hours and some
other value of hours worked, j. Denoting this vector of values as c, we
can define as the set of hours not preferred to h1 when c takes on the
value and rewrite (5)as
12Ciii =—X
—In
(6) L(h: X1,Y1,w1) (a) —(c_1)]
*R(i))
+[1—(c.)] *R.(IT)+(l—V(h))* i,H 1 1






The 's are summed over values of j from one to maximum hours per
week, which in practice is set at 75, and the second term in (6) picks up
the residual tail of the a distribution. The third term, which is non—zero
only when observed hours are zero, is the probability that no work is
preferred to all jobs with positive hours, For reasonable values of the
parameters and'2 the values are monotonic in i. The value of the
unobservable at which the worker is indifferent between working the
observed h1 hours or some alternative, j, can be calculated as
'2 2
h —i
Given the likelihood function (6) for each individual, the log likelihood
for a random sample of M individuals would he
13ln[L(h1: X.,Y.,w1,yi,y2,,o,J1,N)]
1=1
Wewish to treat N, the number of job offers, as a random variable,
drawn independently by each individual in the sample.This requires
evaluating the probability of drawing each possible integer value of N and
summing over these probabilities times the value of the likelihood in (6).
The maximum number of job offers is set at ten, on the basis of preliminary








where the p(x) is the probability of receiving x job offers.
Equality constraints are imposed on p's (parameters of the market
distribution of hours) for groups of values for hours worked. For example,
we assume that the probabilities of drawing offers of from one to 15 hours
are equal. This distribution is estimated with nine steps, 1—15, 16—25, 26—
35, 36—39, 40, 41—45, 46—55, 56—65, and 66—75 hours per week. A subsequent
version of the model allowing more steps failed to rej,cct this restriction.
The parameter for the first group of hours is normalized so that the
probabilitiessumtoone. Oncparameteroftheutilityfunctionmustbe
normalized, since it is defined only up to a positive monotonic
transformation. We have set the parameter A in the income term equal to
1.0.
14As in a conventional labor supply model, preference parameters are in
essence identifiedby the joint distributionof hours, wages, and other
individual characteristics. The variance of the distribution of
unobservables is to a large extent determined by the general goodness—of—
fit between the predicted desired hours and the actual distribution of
hours. The innovation here is that the pattern of discrepancies between
the 'best' predicted distribution and actual hours is employed to identify
the constraints faced by the workers, represented by the shape of the offer
distribution and the number of draws allowed. Note that in order to
describe the degree of constraint faced by individuals, both the estimated
distribution of N and the offer distribution must be taken into account,
and the expected deviation between desired and actual hours will vary over
individuals with different characteristics.
IV,Results
A standard labor supply model and two versions of the model described
above have been estimated on a sample of 555 married men from the control
group of the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, This sample is
described in detail in the Appendix. Model 1 is a standard labor supply
model where all variation in hours is attributed to variation in tastes.
The utility function in (2) was used, with the unobserved components of
tastes (g1's) assumed tobe normally distributed. The parameters of the
utility function and the variance of e were estimated by maximum
likelihood.Model 2 includes restrictions on employment opportunities of
the type described in Section II, treating N as a randor variable with a
binomial distribution over the sample. Model 3 relaxes this distributional
15assumption, and allows the probabilities of receiving from one to ten
offers to vary freely.8
A. Preferences and Desired Hours
Model 1 was estimated so that the bias in estimated preference
parameters resulting from ignoring hours constraints could be assessed.
Misspecification of the budget constraint has been demonstrated tobe a
serious problem for the estimationof labor supply functions. Ignoring
deviations from the standard linear budget constraint between leisure and
income, such as fixed costs of working, tax schedules, etc., can severely
bias estimates of preference parameters, and yield misleading predictions
regarding changes in policy.9
The estimated parameters for our 'no hours constraint' Model 1 are
presented in Table 1. The population—constant preference parameters are
estimated with some precision, batindividualcharacteristics other than
wage and non—labor income have little explanatory power. Table 2 reports
income elasticities for the mean wage rate, and for wages one standard
deviation above and below the mean (all other variables are held at sample
means).These estimates appear quite reasonable——the income elasticities
and the implied compensated wage elasticities have theoretically correct
signs——though the wage elasticities are rather high for a sample of married
men. This, however, is quite typical of the DIME sample.
Column 2 of Table 1 reports the parameter estimates for Model 2, in
which N is random and distributed binomially. Preliminary estimates with
non—randomNsuggested that 10 job offers wouldbe a reasonable raaximum.
The estimated value of p indicates that the mean number of job offers is
16about three)0 To determine an appropriate upper bound for N, we
experimented with several different values. In all cases, it was possible
to reject the hypothesis that the average number of jobs is greater than 5.
The wage elasticities implied by Model 2 are much smaller than the
estimates from Model 1 and the variance of the distribution of the
unobservable has also decreased. Together, these differences imply that
Model 2, which allows for restricted hours choices, predicts a distribution
of desired hours which has a considerably smaller variance over the sample
than does the standard model.
Model 3, which removes the binomial restriction on the distribution of
N, generates results which are even more dramatic in this respect, since
the values of the uncompensated wage elasticity falls in half again. Note
from Table 1, however, that Model 2 cannot be rejected as a restriction on
Model 3. The predicted probabilities for different values of N are similar
to those generated by Model 2 (see Table 3), but were very imprecisely
estimated.
B.The Market Distribution of Offered Hours
Table 4 shows the offer distributions generated by Models 2 and 3, and
contrasts them with the actual distribution of hours worked. The main
discrepancies are a large number of offers in the 1—15 hour range which are
seldom accepted, and a shortage of offers over 40 hours per week.
C.Constraints on Hours Worked
The extent to which an individual is constrained in his choice of
hours depends upon both the number of jobs available to him, and the
































Asymptoticstandard errors in parentheses.
Estimated as (y21)2. Implied value of is 7.1539.
Model 1: N
Model 2: N random—binomial distribution for N—i, mean job offers =
+ 1.
Model 3: N random—no restrictions on p(l) to p(lO).
Specificationfor Number of Job Offers
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Model 1: No Ers. Constraint 0.38 0.36 0.35
Model 2: Binomial Distribution
of Job Offers
0.13 0.12 0.11
Model 3: Unrestricted Distribu—
tion of Job Offers
0.05 0.05 0.05
Income Elasticity
Model 1: No flours Constraint —0.05 —0.04 —0.03
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1—15 8.47 26.60 24.60
16—25 6.85 9.98 11.47
26—35 7.57 7.05 9.27
36—39 8.83 5.71 8.09
40 26.85 14.56 18.03
41—45 21.44 10.79 10.84
46—55 13.87 10.35 7.89
56—65 5.05 9.55 6.59
66—75 1.08 5.43 3.23
20the discrepancy between desired and actual hours for each man in our sample
requires knowledge, not only of the value of N and the offered hours drawn
by each, but also the value of a, the unobserved component of preferences.
We can, however, calcuiate the expected value of this discrepancy for an
individual with given observed characteristics, since we have estimated the
distributions for a, N, and offered hours.
To compute the distribution of desired hours and the difference
between desired and actual hours of work we use Monte Carlo techniques. We
draw for each individual a value for a from a normal distribution, then use
the estimateddistributions ofNto choose a randomnumberof job offers.
The appropriate number of offers are drawn randomly from the offer
distribution, and the estimated utility parameters are used to calculate
the utility asscciated with each offer. The average over the sample of the
highest—utility jobs offer yields the value for constrained hours reported
in Table 5. These values are, of course, close to the mean of actual
hours, but considerablybelow our predictions of desired hours for both
Model 2 and Model 3. The average man in our sample receives three job
offers, and is working several hours a week less than he would like because
offers in the most preferred 45—50 hour range are scarce. The average
absolute deviation between desired and actual hours is from 10 to 12 hours
per week. This is a sizable but, we believe, plausible measure of the
extent to which workers are constrained.
Figure 3 reproduces the patterns of predicted desired hours (smooth
and symmetric), predicted offered hours (a step function with a peak at 40
and excess weight in the lower tail), and actual hours. Desired and
offered hours are calculated using parameter estimates from Model 3.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the deviation between desired and actual
21hours. Note that most of the sample are working fewer hours than they
would prefer.
The most important application for estimates of individual labor
supply response is the analysis of welfare and production effects of
changes in the tax and transfer system. The results presented in Table 5
suggest that there are at least two serious problems with the standard
approach to such policy analysis. First, estimates of the elasticity of
desired labor supply with respect to the tax rate are very sensitive to the
assumption of no hours constraints. For the two models presented here the
estimated effects of both the standard income tax and a flat rate tax with
the same average tax rate are considerably smaller when we allow for hours
constraints.
Second, if we assume that the distribution of offered hours does not
shift in response to a change in the tax code, the predicted changes in
actual hours are considerably smaller than changes in desired hours. These
discrepancies suggest that traditional labor supply models, which ignore
hours constraints, are likely to overestimate tax responses.This
overestimation results from biased utility parameters due to
misspecification and from ignoring the direct effect of restricted hours.
However, the assumption that the distribution of offered hours does not
change is an untenable one. It is possible that even a small change in the
tax structure could produce a large change in the distribution of offered
hours. Thus any analysis which incorporates only the supply response to a
taxchange niayproduce significant over— orunder—estiriatesof the true
response in the presence of restricted hours choice.
22DISTRIIBUTION OF WEEKLY HOURS
DESIRED, OFFERED, IAND ACTUAL
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—70 —60 —50 —40 —30 —20 —10TABLE 5
CONSTRAINTSON HOURS AND SflflJLATEi TAXEFFECTS
(SimulatedSampleAverages)*
Model 1 Model2 Model3
No Hours Binomial Unrestricted
Constraint N N
Desired Hours 38.3 47.2 47.2
ConstrainedHours (34.1) 40.7 38.3
Difference (—4.3) —6.5 8.9
MeanAbsolute (14.7) 9.8 11.6
Difference
1972 Income Tax:
——A Desired Hours —2.16 —0.79 —0.80
——A Actual Hours (—0.67) —0.43 —0.26
Flat Tax:
——A Desired Hours —0.91 —0.18 —0.20
——A Actual Hours (—0.32) —0.10 —0.06
* Plusor minus .1 hrs/week is an upper bound for the 95 percent
confidence interval for these averages. Numbers in parentheses were
calculated using utility parameter estimates from Model 1 and estimates of
the distribution of available hours from Model 3.
25D. Specification Tests
Since DIME is a low income sample, there is likely to be some concern
over the assumption that e, the unobserved component of utility, is
distributed normally, rather than according to some truncated or skewed
distribution. To check for rnisspecification of the distribution of ewe
apply a test proposed by Ruud (1981), in which the argument of the normal
density function is replaced by a polynomial in that argument. In
practice, we replace (e) with (c+C2c2+C33+C4e4+C5c5) in Model 3.
Maximization of the likelihood function with all C's held equal to zero
generates a Lagrange multiplier statistic which is distributed The
value was 6.18, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of normality for a.
The restriction that the market distribution of offered hours is a 9—
step function was also tested, by estimating a model with 17 steps. The
test statistic was 11.8 (compared to a 90 percent critical value of
13.4), so we fail to reject our distributional assumption for the i's.
V.Conclusions
Theresults presented in this paper call into question policy analysis
based on labor supply models which assume that workers may freely choose
how much they work. For example, models which allow for the possibility of
hours constraints yield very different estimates of the effects of tax
changes on desired hours of work. Further, since our results suggest that
hours constraints have a significant impact on hours worked, the
possibility that changes in the distribution of available hours could occur
in response to changes in the tax or transfer system becomes important. To
correctly analyze the effects of such changes, we must model not only the
26labor supply decision but also labor demand, and in particular theprocess
determining the distribution of available hours of work.
One approach to incorporating hours constraints in an empirical labor
supply model is presented in this paper. The specification for hours
constraints we use is a fairly general one. Each worker chooses from among
a finite set of jobs offering fixed hours, which have been drawn at random
from a market distribution. ¶e estimate the mean number of job offers
received to be about three, and the mean absolute difference between
desired and observed hours to be ten hours per week. For this sample,
therefore, hours choices appear to be significantly constrained, with a
large proportion of the sample choosing one of the abundant 40—hour jobs.
It is noteworthy that, since mean desired hours are estimated to be 47.2
hours per week, most individuals are working less than they wish.
Our representation of hours constraints is a stylized one, but gives
apparently sensible results and is suggestive of the way in which future
research might proceed. The estimates of individual disequilibrium and of
wage and income elasticities are, of course, conditional upon our
specification for preferences and the distribution of offered hours.
flowever, specification tests failed to reject our assumptions that the
unobservable component is normally distributed and that the offer
distribution can be represented as a step function with nine steps.
Fruitful extensions to the model presented here might include
experimentation with other functional forms for utility or attempts to
incorporatetied wage—hours offers, which are impl iod by a market
equilibrium involving hours restrictions.
Mostof the individual variation in hours worked is left unexplained
by simple models of unconstrained labor supply. There is a fundamental
27indeterminacy here——we are unable todistingu.ishwithcertaintybetween
unobserved components of preferences and unobserved constraints. However,
in markets where we have some reason to suspect that behavior may be
constrained in the short run, it seems to us good policy to operate on both
fronts simultaneously. Building hours constraints into a labor supply
model explicitly is a first step in one direction; refining our
specification of preferences is a desirable continuation in the other. In
addition, we must begin the task of modelling the demand side of hours
constraints.
28FOOThOTES
1.The independent variables were the wage rate, non—labor income, age,
education, and number of children. The value of R2 was less than
0.03. The distribution was constructed by adding a normal random
variable, with a standard error equal to the s.e.e. for the estimated
equation, to the predicted value for each of the 555workersin our
sample.
2. The derivation of this sort of equilibrium is presented in S. Rosen
(1974) and, in the particular context of hours worked and wages, in
Lewis.
3. Burtless and Hausman (1978) allow for differences betweenworkers'
desired and actual hours worked, but require those deviations to have
a normal distribution and to be independent of observed worker charac-
teristics. Given the discussion above, we would expect the
distribution to be decidedly non—normal and deviations to be
correlated with a worker's desired hours, which is a function of
observed characteristics.
4. Closely related are models incorporating fixed costs of v7orking, such
as those of Cogan (1980, 1981) and Hausman (1980).
5.Weare not aware of any attempts to estimate labor supply models
incorporating in a general way both restricted choice over the market
distribution of offered job packages and the relationship between
wages and hours within packages. Indeed, estimation of such a model
does not at present seem feasible. Gustman and Steirimeier (1984)
allow for tied wage—hours offers, but permit a choice between only two
packages. Estimates of the market equilibrium wage—hours locus by
29Rosen (1976) andLundberg (1984)assumethat individuals maychoose
freely from the entire distribution of offered packages.
6. These should be interpreted, not as individual jobs in the literal
sense, but as employment opportunities which may include multiple jobs
withnon—conflicting hours.
7.Based on some preliminary estimates of the unconstrained model,
individual differences in preferences have been incorporated in the
coefficient of the hours term, though any of the parameters might be
allowed to vary over individuals.
8.The possibility of zero offers, and thus involuntary unemployment, has
been excluded from this version, which uses annual hours and includes
no non—workers.It has, however, been included in versions employing
monthly hours, with no significant change in the conclusions.
9. For example, see Cogan (1980, 1981) and Hausman (1980) for the effects
of incorporating fixed costs to the worker, and Hausman (1983) for a
comprehensive discussion of empirical studies of labor supply with
taxation.
10. The expected number of job offers is 1 +9"p,since we do not cons i—
der the possibility of receiving no job offers.
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32APPENDIX
Data
A sample of 555 married men from the control group of the Denver
Income Maintenance Experiment (DIME) has been used for of this study. Work
experience during 1972 is the relevant measure of hours, but a time series
of up to 48 months of data for each individual is also available. Monthly
information includes total hours worked at all jobs, straight—time hourly
wage on each job, income received from all other sources (including
earnings of other family members and transfer payments——support payments
from DIME were not received by this group), and number of children under 16
years of age in the household.Table A.l presents some important
characteristics of this sample, and more information can be found in
Lundberg (1981).
All men in this sample are between the ages of 18 and 59. The only
individuals excluded from the available population were 10 individuals for
whom education data were missing, and 15 who did not work at all during
1972 (thelatter have been included inthe distributions in Figures 1 and
2).Monthly data for September 1972 were used in a preliminary version of
this model.The inclusion of individuals who did not work during this
monthdid not appear to affect the estimated degree of constraint.
TheDIME data possess several advantages for this type of analysis,
such as excellent monthly information on hours and separate questions for
the wage rate and monthly income. A possible disadvantage arises from the
selection criteria applied to yield a low—income control group for the
experiment——the sample is not representative of the entire population and
this may cause problems in making distributional assumptions for the
33unobserved element of preferences (but see the results of a specification
test in IV.D), as well as limiting the generality of results regarding the
degree of hours constraints. Estimates from this sample, however, benefit
from higher quality data than are available elsewhere, and provide a useful
starting point for applications to more representative samples.
34TABLE A.l
CHARACTERISTICS OF DIME CONTROL SAMPLE---ARRIED MEN
Minimum Mean Maximum
Hourly wage t 0.26 3.49 t 9.23
Weekly average of hours
worked during Sept. 1972
0 39.86 93.80
Weekly average of hours
worked during 1972
1.10 38.41 75.38





c ompl e ted
2.0 11.19 18.0
Age 18.0 33.74 59.0
No. of children under 16 0 2.17 6
No. of observations 555
35